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Abstract 
Tax rates on corporate income have declined in most industrialized countries since the mid 
1980s. Tax competition between countries for mobile capital has been frequently mentioned 
as an explanation for this development. A vast empirical literature dealing with tax competi-
tion for mobile capital has emerged. This paper provides an overview of empirical studies. 
Particular focus is placed on studies modelling strategic interaction in tax policies of compet-
ing jurisdictions which is at the heart of the competition concept. Given the empirical evi-
dence surveyed, it appears that tax rates indeed fall due to tax competition between coun-
tries, in particular due to competition for profits and new firms. Besides summarizing the sub-
stantive implications of the existing empirical literature the paper also addresses the question 
of whether the existing studies can convincingly isolate tax competition as a driver of falling 
corporate income tax rates. 
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1. Introduction 
Statutory corporate income tax rates (STRs) have declined in most industrialized countries 
since the mid 1980s. Tax competition between countries for mobile capital is frequently 
stressed as an explanation for this development. Tax competition between countries (hori-
zontal tax competition) can be defined as any non-cooperative tax setting by governments 
under which each government’s policy choices influence the allocation of mobile tax bases 
among the regions represented by these governments (see Wilson and Wildasin 2004, p. 
1067). Horizontal tax competition therefore implies the strategic interdependence of govern-
ment tax policies.  
A vast empirical literature dealing with horizontal tax competition for mobile capital as a driver 
of falling tax rates has emerged. The main aim of this paper is to categorize and summarize 
the existing empirical studies on this issue. Particular focus is placed on the isolation of the 
substantive implications the quantitative study outcomes convey. This is done by deriving a 
comparable tax rate sensitivity measure, the semi-elasticity of tax rates with respect to differ-
ent explanatory variables, based on the information given in the papers surveyed.  
A semi-elasticity shows the percentage change in the endogenous variable when the exoge-
nous variable changes by one unit (e.g. Wooldridge 2009, p. 46).i Semi-elasticities are fre-
quently used in the tax policy literature to isolate the substantive implications of estimated 
regression coefficients (see e.g. De Mooij and Ederveen 2008; Feld and Heckemeyer 2009). 
However, it is important to note that semi-elasticities depend on the unit of measurement of 
the independent variable. Thus, any study deriving and comparing semi-elasticities should 
make sure that only values are aggregated which are based on comparable units of meas-
urement of the independent variables (see Section 4 for further details).  
Besides summarizing the substantive implications of the existing empirical literature the pa-
per also addresses the question of whether the surveyed studies can convincingly isolate tax 
competition as a driver of falling corporate income tax rates. This is a relevant policy issue as 
the decline in tax rates might – at least partly – have other economic, institutional and politi-
cal causes. Policy recommendations, for instance, with respect to enhanced tax coordination 
efforts may differ across the various causes of falling tax rates on corporate income.  
In particular, besides tax competition, tax rates may fall due to the implementation of “com-
mon intellectual trends” (Griffith and Klemm 2005; Slemrod 2004; Nicodème 2006). Exam-
ples of common intellectual trends are the move towards the implementation of the Schanz-
Haig-Simons concept of income taxation, eventually leading not only to a fall in tax rates 
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paired with tax base broadening but also to the increased integration of corporate and per-
sonal income taxation (Musgrave 1990) and concerns with the deadweight loss of taxation 
resulting from high STRs (Griffith and Klemm 2005). 
Furthermore, changes in the political climate towards a less egalitarian view of distributive 
justice or a more business friendly environment due to a shift to more right-wing parties may 
contribute to declining corporate income tax rates (Persson and Tabellini 2000; Musgrave 
1990). Moreover, yardstick competition (Brueckner 2003) may lead to falling tax rates if vot-
ers react to differences in tax rates inducing policy-makers to follow tax rate changes in 
neighbouring jurisdictions. Thus, yardstick competition is based on a taxpayer’s “voice” op-
tion in contrast to the “exit” option as in the case of tax competition (see Hirschman 1970).  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a brief discussion of what types of 
capital (investments) countries may compete for with different tax rates. Section 3 provides a 
broad classification of the available empirical studies. Sections 4 and 5 present the results 
derived based on the empirical studies surveyed and Section 6 discusses the results. Finally, 
the main findings are summarized in Section 7. 
2. Types of capital and corporate income tax rates 
Governments may compete for new firms, for the investment of existing firms and for profits 
generated in one country but shifted by firms to another country, for instance, via favourable 
transfer pricing agreements with related firms (see Devereux 2007). Thus, countries compete 
for three different types of capital which are highly correlated and integrated. A crucial point 
here is that these three types of capital may react to differences and changes in distinct tax 
rates (see e.g. Devereux 2007): Conceptually, new firms are located where after tax profits 
are highest. The latter crucially hinge upon the average tax rate levied on corporate income. 
Put differently, tax induced incentives to establish a new firm are exerted by a low effective 
average tax rate on a firm’s pre-tax profit.ii In contrast, the investment of already established 
firms is driven by the cost of capital and thus by the effective marginal tax rate. Finally, the 
incentive to shift profits is crucially determined by the STR.iii 
To empirically analyze the presence of tax competition, it is crucial to know how the men-
tioned tax rates can be operationalized. This is comparatively simple for the STR which can 
be directly taken from tax codes. Measuring effective tax rates is more complicated, not least 
because different concepts of effective tax rates are proposed in the literature. Specifically, 
backward and forward looking effective tax rates are distinguished. The former may further 
be separated into macro- and micro-level tax rates. Macro-level backward looking average 
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effective tax rates (MA-AETR) in the spirit of Mendoza et al. (1994) are based on accrued 
corporate income tax revenue data in the nominator and a suitable measure for the tax base 
(e.g. a corporation’s net operating surplus) in the denominator. Besides MA-AETR in some 
cases the ratio of corporate income tax revenues to GDP or to total tax revenues (AETR) is 
used to proxy the average corporate income tax burden at the macro-level. Data used to cal-
culate these rates come from National Accounts and Revenue Statistics. In contrast, micro-
level backward looking average tax rates (MI-AETR) are based on firms’ balance sheet in-
formation. A widely cited study deriving MI-AETRs is Nicodème (2001).iv Backward looking 
rates reflect outcomes from past saving, investment and financing decisions which are inter 
alia made based on past tax laws. Thus, these tax rates are not primarily relevant for analyz-
ing current and future financing and investment decisions of firms as tax laws may change 
over time.v 
Forward looking effective tax rates measure the tax burden levied on a hypothetical, pro-
spective investment project of a firm. The calculation of forward looking tax rates is based on 
a present value framework (see Devereux and Griffith 1998). The tax rate and tax base in-
formation used in the calculations is directly taken from current and future (expected) tax 
laws. Forward looking effective average tax rates (EATR) as well as forward looking effective 
marginal tax rates (EMTR) can be derived for domestic and international investments.  
EATRs measure the tax burden on a hypothetical infra-marginal investment project, that is, 
on one which earns a positive economic rent. EMTRs, in contrast, measure the impact of 
taxes on the cost of capital. Thus, the focus is on an investment which exactly breaks even. 
Domestic tax rates capture the tax laws of a prospective host country of investment. Interna-
tional (bilateral) tax rates additionally include stipulations contained in double taxation 
agreements, unilaterally binding tax laws towards foreign investment and supranational tax 
laws.  
Due to their forward looking nature EATRs and EMTRs are of use when analyzing the incen-
tive effects taxes exert on firms’ investment and financing decisions. Hence, these tax rates 
are a suitable choice for analyzing tax competition for new firms (the EATR) and the invest-
ment of established firms (the EMTR). Thereby domestic forward looking effective tax rates 
are more appropriate than bilateral tax rates as the latter also contain stipulations which rep-
resent steps to coordinate tax laws. For instance, double tax agreements are a form of tax 
coordination by explicit agreement between countries and supranational tax law is a type of 
tax coordination by delegation (Wildasin 2002). Thus, bilateral forward looking effective tax 
rates can fall over time due the coordination of corporate income taxation. For instance, the 
adoption of the Parent Subsidiary Directive of the EU by new EU member states in 2004 
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leads to a substantial simultaneous drop in bilateral effective tax rates (see e.g. Bellak and 
Leibrecht 2007) which is not triggered by tax competition for mobile capital.  
Finally, note that the STR might be considered being a special type of forward looking tax 
rate which is not effective. As previously mentioned, this tax rate is relevant for analyzing tax 
induced incentives to shift profits and hence for exploring the presence of tax competition for 
profits. 
3. Classification of empirical tax competition studies  
Following Griffith and Klemm (2005), empirical studies dealing with tax competition issues 
may be separated into indirect and direct studies. Studies are classified as indirect if they do 
not explicitly analyze the presence of tax competition but explore a precondition for tax com-
petition namely the tax sensitivity of various types of capital (cf. Table 1). Corporate income 
tax rates are contained in the set of independent variables. Numerous indirect studies have 
emerged and comprehensive reviews are already available (see DeMooij and Ederveen 
2003 and 2008; Devereux and Griffith 2002; Devereux 2006 and 2007; Feld and Hecke-
meyer 2009). These surveys suggest an empirically significant relationship between taxes 
and various types of capital. Specifically, Devereux (2007, p. 41) concludes in his survey of 
indirect studies that corporate income taxes play a significant role for the location of new 
firms and for profits. A “precondition” for tax competition to exist is thus fulfilled, at least for 
capital in form of new firms and profits.vi 
In contrast, direct studies capture tax rates and their most important determinants within an 
empirical model. These studies can be further separated into first and second generation 
direct studies depending on whether or not they model strategic interaction in tax policies. 
Thus, direct studies deal with the tax competition issue more explicitly by explaining the de-
velopment in tax rates. First generation direct studies explain the development in tax rates by 
changes in various independent variables capturing a country’s degree of openness. In this 
case an increase in a country’s openness leading to a decrease in the level of tax rates is 
seen as an indication for the presence of tax competition.  
A conceptual drawback of the first generation direct studies is that they do not model the 
strategic interaction in tax policies which is at the heart of the tax competition concept. This 
shortcoming is overcome by direct studies of the second generation. These explicitly model 
and test strategic interaction in tax policies between jurisdictions via estimation of tax reac-
tion functions. Specifically, the strategic interaction in tax policies is modelled by defining a 
country’s tax rate as a function of the averaged tax rates of competitor jurisdictions (e.g. 
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Devereux et al. 2008). Here, a positive relationship between a country’s tax rate and the 
competitors’ tax rate is seen as an indication of the presence of tax competition. Table 1 
summarizes the different approaches to analyzing tax competition. 
4. First generation direct studies 
Tax competition between countries implies that capital can react to differences and changes 
in tax rates. Thus, countries need to be sufficiently open for horizontal tax competition be-
tween countries to set in. First generation direct studies are based on this “precondition” of 
horizontal tax competition and model the relationship between tax rates on corporate income 
and a country’s degree of openness.  
A variety of definitions of a country’s openness are used in the first generation studies. On a 
fundamental level, de jure, de facto and mixed openness measures can be distinguished. De 
jure measures focus on a country’s laws with respect to capital, goods and service mobility, 
such as current account convertibility, the number of bilateral double taxation agreements or 
the number of bilateral investment treaties. In contrast, de facto measures are based on ob-
servable interactions between countries, such as trade and FDI flows or the importance of 
Table 1: Classification of studies on horizontal tax competition 
Study type Explained variable Independent variable of main 
interest 
Outcome in favour of  tax 
competition  
Indirect Foreign capital in country i 
or capital from country j in 
country i 
Tax rate of country i or bilateral 
tax rate for countries i and j 
Significant negative impact of 
an increase in the tax burden on 
foreign capital 
Direct 1st generation Tax rate of country i Openness of country i Significant negative impact of 
an increase in a country’s 
openness on tax rates 
Direct 2nd generation Tax rate of country i Averaged tax rates of competi-
tor countries 
Decrease in the averaged tax 
rates of competitor countries 
leads to a statistically significant 
decrease in the tax rate of 
country i 
Notes: Capital = (Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Property, Plant Equipment, profit, number of foreign affiliates, etc); In case of 
indirect studies, usually a negative coefficient on the tax variable is indicative of the fulfilment of the precondition for tax competi-
tion; yet, in some cases – e.g., when analyzing the profit shifting behaviour of firms – a positive coefficient is also compatible 
with this precondition (see e.g. Weichenrieder 2009 for an example). 
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foreign ownership of firm assets. Mixed openness indicators combine de jure and de facto 
aspects into a summary measure (e.g. the KOF globalization index used by Dreher 2006).  
Table 2 contains characteristics of 12 studies surveyed.vii It is obvious that the vast majority 
of studies are based on a type of average tax rate, usually the MA-AETR, and on OECD 
countries. Five studies apply forward looking effective tax rates. Thereof four studies apply 
domestic and one study uses bilateral forward looking effective tax rates which also capture 
measures of tax coordination (see above). With respect to the proxy variable for a country’s 
openness considerable heterogeneity is given. Furthermore, the econometric estimators ap-
plied vary substantially across studies. However, the majority of studies show a negative re-
lationship between a country’s openness and the level of capital income taxation (see col-
umn seven of Table 2). Only four studies report positive coefficients. 
To elaborate on the substantive importance of a country’s openness for the development of 
tax rates, semi-elasticities of tax rates with respect to changes in the openness variables are 
derived based on the information given in the various studies contained in Table 2. As noted 
above the semi-elasticity depends on the unit of measurement of the independent variable, 
here an openness variable.viii To cope with this issue we first have separated the presenta-
tion of semi-elasticities with respect to de facto openness variables in the two most frequently 
used measures of a country’s de facto openness: GDP based (e.g. FDI or trade to GDP) and 
firm asset based (percent of foreign ownership in firm assets) openness variables. This en-
sures that the respective mean semi-elasticity shows the mean percentage change in the 
endogenous variable (a tax rate) when the independent variable changes by one percentage 
point of GDP or firm assets, respectively. Second, we have excluded the study of Garretsen 
and Peeters (2007) from the analysis as these authors apply FDI flows, not normalized by 
GDP or assets but by gross fixed capital formation, as de facto measure for openness. Note 
however that Garretsen and Peeters (2007) find support for a negative impact of the degree 
of de facto openness on the EATR (cf. Table 2). 
Table 3 displays the main results of our descriptive analysis. The table is structured across 
several dimensions. First, means, standard deviations, 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles, min-
ima and maxima as well as the share of significant underlying regression coefficients are 
reported.ix Second, a separation between single-openness models which contain only one 
openness proxy per regression and multi-openness models containing several openness 
variables is made. This separation aims to consider that the simultaneous usage of more 
than one openness variable may affect the significance, size and sign of the underlying re-
gression coefficients and in succession also of the derived semi-elasticities. Interrelation-
ships in multi-openness models may arise, for instance, due to multi-collinearity which inter 
8 
 
alia might lead to “wrong signs” of coefficients (see Kennedy 2005 for further details). Third, 
the information contained in Table 3 is structured by the various types of openness variables 
used in the surveyed studies. Thereby the de facto measures are further separated into GDP 
based and asset based measures. Fourth, results are separated by the type of tax rate used 
(EATR, EMTR, STR, MI-AETR, MA-AETR) to isolate differences in the marginal effects of 
changes in a country’s openness across tax rates. 
Starting with single-openness models Table 3 implies that the mean and median semi-
elasticities are negatively signed in each case but those for regressions based on MI-AETR. 
The latter rates are only used in papers using asset based de facto openness measures. In 
most instances the majority of underlying regression coefficients is also statistically signifi-
cant different from zero (see the last column of Table 3). Thus, the surveyed evidence is in 
favour of a negative impact of an increase in a country’s openness on tax rates on capital 
income. This conclusion is particularly valid for studies explaining variations in STRs, MA-
AETRs and EATRs. For EMTRs as dependent variable only one regression coefficient, 
which is statistically insignificant, enters our calculations. Thus, the results from single-
openness models are consistent with the presence of tax competition for profits (STR) and 
firms (EATR and MA-EATR). 
However, studies using MI-AETR come up with a mean semi-elasticity of about 1.14. These 
results imply that, when using firm-level data, an increase in the country’s openness by one 
unit increases the micro-level average effective tax rate by 1.14 percent. This somewhat sur-
prising positive mean semi-elasticity has to be evaluated against the specific proxy variable 
for a country’s openness used in the empirical analysis - the share of foreign ownership in 
total firm assets. An increase in the share of foreign ownership increases tax rates. Thus, the 
studies based on the MI-AETR support the view that governments try to “export” corporate 
income tax burden rather than to reduce the tax burden on foreign capital.x  
Turning to multiple-openness models the results are qualitatively similar even if the size of 
mean semi-elasticities derived is different, which stresses that results from single- and multi-
openness models should not be aggregated. However note that in case of regressions based 
on mixed openness measures the mean and median semi-elasticities derived are positively 
signed. A closer look at the last two columns of Table 3, section multi-openness models and 
mixed measures reveals that these values are based on few regression coefficients (six), 
mainly driven by the positive results from one study (Dreher 2006).  
To summarize, the first generation direct studies analyze the presence of tax competition for 
mobile capital by modelling the relationship between a country’s openness and its capital 
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(corporate) income tax rates. Overall, the surveyed studies support a negative relation be-
tween a country’s openness and its capital income tax rate. Specifically, evidence is in favour 
of tax competition for profits and new firms. However, although the first generation direct 
studies are quite intuitive, they do not model strategic interactions in tax settings which are at 
the heart of the entire tax competition concept. This provides the starting point for the second 
generation direct studies.  
 
 
10 
 
Table 2: Summary of first generation direct studies 
Author(s) 
Tax rate 
definition 
Tax base 
definition Openness definition Estimation technique1 Sample 
Results for 
openness 
Number of 
semi-
elasticities 
Adam and Kam-
mas (2007) 
MA-AETR, 
EATR and 
STR 
Corporate 
income 
Quinn (1997) index on capital market 
integration, (Exp+Imp)/GDP size corrected 
OLS with fixed country and 
time effects and PCSE 
1970 - 1997 
17 OECD countries 
Negative 
significant 
(-++) 
9 
Bretschger (2008) MA-AETR Corporate 
income 
Combined measure of capital market 
restrictions after Dreher and Siemers 
(2005) and (Exp+Imp)/GDP 
2SLS, SURE, OLS with PCSE 
with time trends, 3SLS 
1965 - 1999 
12 OECD countries 
Negative 
significant 
(+++) 
9 
Bretschger and 
Hettich (2002) 
MA-AETR Corporate 
income 
Quinn (1997) index on capital as well as 
on capital and goods market integration, 
(Exp+Imp)/GDP size corrected 
OLS with PCSE and fixed time 
effects, static and dynamic 
models 
1967 - 1996 
14 OECD countries 
Positive and 
negative 
significant 
(-++) 
39 
Clausing (2008) STR Corporate 
income 
FDI outflows in percent of GDP OLS 1979 - 2002 
36 OECD countries 
Negative 
significant 
(-++) 
5 
Dreher (2006) MA-AETR Capital 
income 
KOF globalization index OLS with fixed country and 
time effects, GMM ala Arellano 
and Bond (1991) with fixed 
time effects, static and dy-
namic models 
1970 - 2000 
OECD countries 
Positive 
significant 
(-+) 
7 
Garretsen and 
Peeters (2007) 
EATR Corporate 
income 
Sum of FDI in- and outflows in percent of 
gross fixed capital formation 
 
2SLS with fixed time effects 
 
1981 - 2001 
19 OECD countries 
Negative 
significant  
(+++)  
n.i.2 
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Huizinga and 
Nicodème (2006) 
MI-AETR Corporate 
income 
Share of foreign ownership in firm assets OLS and WLS both with fixed 
country or/and time effects 
1996 - 2000 
34 countries 
Positive 
significant 
(-++) 
52 
Krogstrup (2005) EATR Corporate 
income 
Quinn (1997) index on capital and goods 
market integration 
OLS on first differences, 2SLS 1980 - 2001 
13 EU countries 
Negative 
significant 
(-++) 
11 
Loretz (2007) Bilateral 
EMTR and 
EATR 
Corporate 
income 
(Exp+Imp)/GDP, intra EU dummy for 
economic integration 
OLS with fixed country-pair 
effects and a time trend, 
Hausman-Taylor estimator 
1991 - 2004 
27 OECD countries 
Negative 
significant 
(-++) 
7 
Slemrod (2004) STR and 
AETR 
Corporate 
income 
(Exp+Imp)/GDP, Sachs-Warner openness 
indicator (Sachs and Warner (1995)) 
OLS with fixed country and 
time effects  
1980 - 1995 
Unknown number of 
developed and 
developing countries 
Positive and 
negative 
(-) 
4 
Swank and 
Steinmo (2002) 
STR and 
MA-AETR 
Corporate 
and capital 
income 
Quinn (1997) index on capital market 
integration, (Exp+Imp)/GDP* 
OLS with PSCE with fixed 
country and time effects 
1981 - 1995 
13 countries 
Negative 
significant 
(-+) 
8 
Winner (2005) MA-AETR 
and EMTR 
Capital 
income 
Quinn (1997) index on capital and goods 
market integration 
Static models via FGLS with 
fixed country and time effects, 
and dynamic models via GMM 
ala Arellano and Bond (1991) 
with fixed time effects 
1965 - 2000 
23 OECD countries 
Negative 
significant t 
(+++) 
8 
Notes: (+++) all underlying regression coefficients are significant. (-++) more than half of the underlying regression coefficients significant (but not all). (-+) about half of the underlying regres-
sion coefficients significant. (-) less than 50 percent of underlying regression coefficients significant. Significance level: 20% with two-sided test statistic and 10% with a one-sided test statistic. 
1 PCSE: Panel corrected standard errors, 2SLS: two stage least squares estimator, SUR: seemingly unrelated regression estimation, 3SLS: three stage least squares estimator, GMM: gener-
alized method of moments estimator, WLS: weighted least squares estimator, and FGLS: feasible general least squares estimator. 2 n.i.: not included in the analysis. . 
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Table 3: Summary information on semi-elasticities of the openness variable(s) (without extreme outliers1) 
 Mean Std.dev. Min. 25 Perc. Median 75 Perc. Max. 
Share of 
significant2 
regression 
coefficients 
1. Single-openness models         
a. De facto measures         
i. GDP based         
Overall -0.9877 1.7258 -8.0000 -0.7317 -0.5833 -0.4440 -0.0575 13 / 19 
Tax definitions          
MA-AETR -0.6288 0.3559 -1.3420 -0.6926 -0.4798 -0.4440 -0.2152 6 / 10 
STR -1.4396 2.6605 -8.0000 -0.7195 -0.5949 -0.4152 -0.0575 7 / 8 
EMTR -0.9619 - -0.9619 -0.9619 -0.9619 -0.9619 -0.9619 0 / 1 
ii. Asset based         
Tax definitions          
MI-AETR 1.1366 1.3571 -0.8996 0.0620 1.1029 1.5327 5.3070 24 / 40 
         
b. De jure measures         
Overall -0.5938 0.5127 -0.9524 -0.9524 -0.8225 -0.0066 -0.0066 2 / 3 
Tax definitions          
MA-AETR -0.0066 - -0.0066 -0.0066 -0.0066 -0.0066 -0.0066 0 / 1 
EATR -0.8874 0.0918 -0.9524 -0.9524 -0.8874 -0.8225 -0.8225 2 / 2 
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c. Mixed measures         
Tax definitions          
MA-AETR -5.4347 4.5935 -8.1508 -7.2993 -6.6133 -6.1660 7.4565 10 / 10 
         
2. Multiple-openness models         
a. De facto measures         
i. GDP based         
Overall -1.8752 4.7228 -17.5000 -0.5254 -0.1500 -0.0455 4.1667 29 / 39 
Tax definitions          
MA-AETR -0.2949 0.2282 -0.5922 -0.5106 -0.3587 -0.1071 0.0028 19 / 23 
EATR -4.2394 6.0154 -16.3824 -8.7647 -0.0569 0.1197 0.6105 5 / 9 
STR -0.1218 0.0733 -0.2109 -0.1804 -0.1147 -0.0631 -0.0469 3 / 4 
EMTR -9.2361 11.7118 -17.5000 -17.5000 -14.375 4.1667 4.1667 2 / 3 
ii. Asset based         
Tax definitions          
MI-AETR 0.6863 0.7778 -0.0197 0.0628 0.2243 1.2239 2.3078 11 / 12 
         
b. De jure measures         
Overall -0.2336 1.2766 -4.9906 -0.0678 -0.0333 -0.0043 2.8784 16 / 30 
Tax definitions          
MA-AETR 0.0978 0.6545 -0.8327 -0.0362 -0.0285 0.0024 2.8783 10 / 22 
EATR -0.0541 0.0214 -0.0881 -0.0608 -0.0560 -0.0387 -0.0252 5 / 6 
14 
 
STR -4.4166 0.8118 -4.9906 -4.9906 -4.4166 -3.8425 -3.8425 1 / 2 
         
c. Mixed measures         
Overall 6.7260 3.6415 3.2703 3.5958 5.6170 9.9546 12.3013 3 / 6 
Tax definitions          
MA-AETR 7.7309 4.0826 3.5958 4.3340 7.5132 11.1279 12.3013 3 / 4 
STR 4.7162 2.0449 3.2703 3.2703 4.7162 6.1621 6.1321 0 / 2 
         
Notes: 1 Semi-elasticities which are two times the standard deviation of the overall sample are treated as outliers and are not included in the analysis. 2 Significance level: the signifi-
cance level is that of the underlying regression coefficient; 20% with two-sided test statistic and 10% with a one-sided test statistic. 3 De jure measures are trade restriction measures 
like the Quinn indexes or the Sachs-Warner index. De facto measures are FDI flows, trade flows, and other measures of real interactions between countries as share in GDP and the 
share of foreign ownership in firm assets. Dreher’s (2006) KOF index of globalization and Bretschger’s (2008) openness measure which combines the IMF measure (de jure) with trade 
flows (de facto) are both categorized as mixed openness measures. Perc. = percentile. 
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5. Second generation direct studies 
Second generation direct studies explicitly model the strategic interaction in tax settings by 
independent jurisdictions via tax reaction functions. Strategic interdependencies arise 
“whenever the actions of some unit(s) affect the marginal utility of alternative actions for 
some other unit(s)” (Franzese and Hays 2009, p. 234). The tax policy towards capital of 
country i has an impact on the welfare level in country j due to its impact on the capital stock 
in the latter country. This may trigger a tax policy response in country j. Hence, the optimal 
tax policy choice of country i depends on country’s j policy and vice versa (Franzese and 
Hayes 2009). Put differently, the tax rates of competing countries are strategic complements 
in case of horizontal tax competition. This implies that tax policies towards capital move in 
the same direction: a decrease in the tax rate of country i would induce country j to also 
lower its corresponding tax rate (Devereux et al. 2008; Franzese and Hays 2009).  
From a theoretical viewpoint, strategic interactions in tax settings are modelled in the form of 
“Nash games” and “Stackelberg games”. Models of the first type are based on the idea of 
simultaneous tax setting strategies, while those of the second sort are based on the tax set-
ting of a large and dominant tax setting jurisdiction (e.g. the US) to which other countries re-
act (e.g. Altshuler and Goodspeed 2002).  
From a more empirical viewpoint, modelling strategic interdependencies within a Nash game 
framework implies that, among the right-hand side variables determining the level of the tax 
rate in country i (Taxi), the weighted average tax rate of all competitor countries (WTax-j) is 
included. Models containing WTax-j are frequently termed “spatial lag models” as the spatial 
correlation modelled pertains to the dependent variable. Specifically, “a spatial lag [...] con-
structs a new variable that consists of the weighted average of neighboring observations” 
(Anselin et al. 2008, p. 629).  
Modelling strategic interdependencies within a Stackelberg game framework means that 
TaxL(t-1), the “leader’s” lagged tax rate, is among the set of independent variables. The lagged 
tax rate is used to capture the fact that the Stackelberg leader moves first in the tax game 
(Altshuler and Goodspeed 2002). Frequently TaxL(t-1) is included together with WTax-j in an 
empirical model (henceforth “mixed Nash and Stackelberg models”). 
Presence of horizontal tax competition is signalled by a positive sign of the estimated coeffi-
cients on WTax-j and TaxL(t-1).xi Moreover, the coefficient on WTax-j should be lower than 1 in 
magnitude to preclude “an explosive pattern of spatial dependence.” (Anselin 1988, p. 86)  
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In case of Nash game models the definition of the weighting matrix (W) is crucial as it deter-
mines which competitor countries are considered to have an impact on Taxi and how the 
competitors’ tax rates are averaged. Based on Redoano (2007) the most common operation-
alizations of W can be summarized as follows: (i) uniform weights; (ii) geographic and eco-
nomic distance weights; (iii) size weights; (iv) weights capturing economic ties between a 
country pair and (v) openness weights (cf. Table 4).  
Uniform weights mean that each competitor country gets equal weight in the averaging of tax 
rates. Put differently, the development in taxes of geographically or economically close coun-
tries has no enhanced impact on a particular jurisdiction’s tax policy. Thus, a statistical sig-
nificant relationship between Taxi and WTax-j in case uniform weights are applied is consis-
tent with the view that tax rate cuts are inter alia driven by common intellectual trends like 
tax-rate-cum-base-broadening strategies (see Redoano 2007, p. 9). In contrast, the geo-
graphic and economic distance weights cover the idea of similar movements and develop-
ments in the tax policies of close neighbours (geographic distance) and countries with similar 
capital endowment (GDP per capita distance).  
GDP-level weights intend to capture size effects assuming that large countries are more 
likely to take the role of “leaders” in tax setting. Specifically, EU (US) weights imply that 
changes in a country’s tax rate are predominately determined by changes in the correspond-
ing tax rates of EU countries (or the US). Size weights are thus capable to incorporate the 
concept of leadership also into Nash game models. 
Weighting matrixes based on bilateral FDI and trade linkages (economic ties weights) cap-
ture the fact that economic ties between countries also strengthen their strategic interaction 
in tax policies. Finally, openness weights account for the idea that more open economies are 
more likely to engage in strategic tax competition.  
Table 4: The most common weighting schemes 
Weight(s) Hypothesis of interaction type 
Uniform weight Common intellectual trend in tax setting 
Geographic distance (e.g. contiguity, distance 
decay function) and economic distance (e.g. 
GDP per capita distance) weights 
Enhanced influence of close geographic and eco-
nomic neighbours on a jurisdiction’s tax policy 
Size weights (e.g. GDP-level or EU (US) 
weights) 
Size of countries matters for strategic interactions in 
tax settings (leadership concept in Nash models) 
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Economic ties weights (e.g. bilateral FDI and 
trade linkages) 
Economic ties strengthens strategic interaction in 
tax policies 
Openness weights (e.g. FDI or trade to GDP) Openness strengthens strategic interaction in tax 
policies 
 
Table 5 gives an overview of the various second generation direct studies surveyed.xii An 
often cited paper estimating tax reaction functions is Devereux et al. (2008). These authors 
model interactions in the setting of statutory as well as effective marginal tax rates on corpo-
rate income (i.e. STRs and EMTRs). Hence, the authors are directly concerned with the 
competition for profits and investments of already established firms.xiii They derive a theoreti-
cal Nash game model of horizontal corporate income tax competition from which tax reaction 
functions are derived. These are then estimated using data on STRs and EMTRs of 21 
OECD countries from 1982 until 1999. Devereux et al. (2008) state that they “found strong 
evidence that they [taxes, the authors] do respond to changes in other countries’ taxes.” (p. 
1231)  
In particular, in their basic specification (Table 2 in Devereux et al. 2008) the authors estab-
lish that STRs respond to changes in other countries’ STRs. This result is present across 
different definitions of the weighting matrix (e.g. uniform and GDP-level weights). However, 
for the EMTR a significant response is given only in the case of uniform weights. In their pre-
ferred empirical specifications (see Table 3 in Devereux et al. 2008) they find that strategic 
interaction in STRs is present only if (a) none of the countries considered has significant 
capital controls in place and (b) only in case uniform weights are used.xiv  
The authors use the first finding to discriminate tax competition from other causes of falling 
tax rates. They conclude that “[...] strategic interaction in statutory rates is not well-explained 
by other theories (such as yardstick competition or common intellectual trends), since it is 
generally present only between open economies without significant capital controls: thus, it is 
best explained in terms of competition over mobile profit […]” (Devereux et al. 2008, p. 
1231). The basic point here is that horizontal tax competition between countries is an “open 
economies issue”, whereas other causes of falling tax rates may influence tax policies, even 
in the case of closed economies (see Section 6 for further discussion). Yet, the finding of a 
significant interrelationship mainly in case of uniform weights points towards the importance 
of common intellectual trends as determinants of STRs (cf. Table 4) rather than the working 
of tax competition between countries. 
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In line with Devereux et al. (2008) several other authors (e.g. Davis and Voget 2008; Dreher 
2006; Overesch and Rincke 2009; Redoano 2003, 2007; Swank 2006, 2007) also control for 
a country’s openness. Indeed, given the results derived from first generation direct studies 
which imply that the level of a country’s openness has a significant negative impact on a 
country’s tax rates, the inclusion of an openness proxy should be standard to reduce the like-
lihood of a biased coefficient on WTax-j (also see Franzese and Hays 2009 on this issue). 
From a European perspective of particular interest is the study of Davis and Voget (2008). 
They find that EU member states react more to tax rate changes of other EU members than 
to the changes of non-EU members. Therefore, they conclude “that expansion of the EU may 
lead to more aggressive tax competition.” (p. 22) This result is plausible as the internal mar-
ket in the EU offers free movement of goods, services, persons and capital. Restrictions on 
cross-border movements of capital are of relatively lower importance within the EU as they 
are with respect to third countries. However, the results of Davis and Voget (2008) contrast 
to those derived by Redoano (2007). She finds that countries are more interdependent with 
each other before joining the EU. Once countries are EU members they act more independ-
ently.xv Moreover, Crabbé and Vanderbussche (2009) find that neighbouring countries of the 
new EU member states react to downward revisions of tax rates in these states by also re-
ducing their corresponding tax rates. In addition Crabbé and Vanderbussche (2009) find that 
countries not neighbouring the new EU member states not only react less to tax rate 
changes of the latter country group but also that they do not react to tax rate alterations of 
old EU member states. These findings indicate that the geographic distance to new EU 
members is important for competing with them, whereas there seem to be no reaction be-
tween the old EU members.  
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Table 5: Summary of second generation direct studies. 
Author(s) 
Tax rate 
definition 
Tax base 
definition 
Functional 
specification 
Weights Estimation technique1 Sample used Results 
Number of 
semi-
elasticities 
1. Studies using a model with tax reaction functions to uncover the mechanism of tax competition ... 
a. without a country’s openness as independent variable  
Altshuler and 
Goodspeed 
(2002) 
AETR Corporate 
income 
Nash and mixed 
Nash and 
Stackelberg 
model 
Geographic distance 
weights 
IV approach with first 
differences and fixed 
country effects 
1968 – 1996 
17 European coun-
tries + US 
Nash type of tax competition 
present and US is leader in tax 
policy 
17 
Brueckner and 
Saavedra 
(2001) 
AETR Property Nash model Geographic distance 
weights 
ML approach 1980, 1990 
70 cities in the 
Boston metropolitan 
area 
Nash type of tax competition 
present 
n.i2 
Charlot and 
Paty (2005) 
STR Local 
business 
Nash model Geographic distance 
weights  
ML approach 2002 
French localities, 
departments and 
regions 
Nash type of tax competition 
present 
n.i 
Chatelais and 
Peyrat (2008) 
STR Corporate 
income 
Nash and mixed 
Nash and 
Stackelberg 
model 
Geographic distance 
and size weights 
GMM (Kelejian and Prucha 
1998) 
1995 – 2006 
25 EU countries + 
Iceland 
Nash type of tax competition 
present; stronger reaction to tax 
setting of small countries within 
the centre 
41 
Crabbé and 
Vandenbussche 
(2009) 
STR Corporate 
income 
Nash model Geographic, economic 
distance and eco-
nomic ties weights  
IV approach 1993 – 2006 
15 EU countries 
Nash type of tax competition 
present; reaction to new EU-
member states’ tax cuts is 
stronger for close neighbours 
10 
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Hayashi and 
Boadway (2001) 
AETR Corporate 
income 
Nash and mixed 
Nash and 
Stackelberg 
model 
Uniform weights SURE 1963 – 1996 
10 provinces of 
Canada 
Negative reaction on federal tax 
changes (vertical tax competition) 
and Nash type of tax competition 
between provinces present 
n.i 
Hill (2008) STR Property 
and option 
sales 
Nash model Geographic and eco-
nomic distance 
weights 
IV approach with county 
and year fixed effects 
1993 – 2003 
County governments 
in Tennessee 
Nash type of tax competition 
present; in urban counties reaction 
on sales tax increase is negative 
with contiguity and income weights 
n.i 
Rork (2003) STR and 
AETR 
Corporate 
income 
and sales 
Nash model Geographic distance 
weights 
GMM approach (Kelejian 
and Prucha 1998), year 
and state fixed effects 
1967 – 1996 
48 US states 
Nash type of tax competition 
present 
n.i 
Ruiz and 
Gerard (2008) 
STR, 
EATR, 
MA- and 
MI-AETR 
Capital 
and corpo-
rate in-
come 
Nash model Geographic and eco-
nomic distance 
weights  
ML approach with time 
fixed effects, IV approach 
1979 – 2001 
15 EU countries 
Nash type of tax competition 
present with geographic distance 
weights 
49 
b. with a  country’s openness as independent variable 
Davies and 
Voget (2008) 
STR and 
EATR 
Corporate 
income 
Nash model Uniform, geographic 
and economic dis-
tance as well as 
openness weights 
OLS, time trend and coun-
try fixed effects 
1980 – 2005 
19 countries 
Nash type of tax competition 
present; tax competition especially 
between EU members 
59 
Devereux, 
Lockwood and 
Redoano (2008) 
STR and 
EMTR 
Corporate 
income 
Nash model Uniform, size and 
openness weights 
IV with country-specific 
time trends and country 
fixed effects 
1982 – 1999 
21 OECD countries 
Strategic interaction in case of 
sufficient open economies; how-
ever then also only if uniform 
weights are applied 
18 
Dreher (2006) MA-AETR, 
EATR and 
Capital 
income 
Nash model Uniform and openness 
weight 
OLS with fixed country 
effects 
1970 - 2000 
OECD countries 
Nash type of tax competition not 
present 
16 
21 
 
EMTR 
Overesch and 
Rincke (2009) 
STR, 
EATR and 
EMTR  
Corporate 
income 
Nash model Geographic distance 
weight 
 
OLS and IV with country 
fixed effects and some 
also with time trends 
1983 – 2006 
32 European coun-
tries 
Nash type of tax competition 
present 
8 
Pitlik (2005) EATR Capital 
income 
Nash model Uniform and size 
weights 
GMM (Arellano-Bond 
1991) with time trend 
1970 - 1998 
15 EU countries 
Nash type of tax competition 
present; negative effect of open-
ness 
10 
Redoano (2003) STR Corporate 
income 
Nash model Geographic distance, 
economic distance 
and size weights 
IV approach 1980 – 1995 
13 EU countries 
(pooled cross-
sectional) 
Nash type of tax competition 
present; negative effect of open-
ness 
4 
Redoano (2007) STR Corporate 
income 
Nash model Uniform, geographic 
distance, economic 
distance and open-
ness weights 
GMM (Arellano-Bond 
1991) 
1970 – 1999 
17 western Euro-
pean countries 
Nash type of tax competition 
present; EU members act more 
independently than non-EU coun-
tries 
42 
Swank (2006) STR and 
EATR 
Capital 
and corpo-
rate in-
come 
Nash model Uniform and economic 
ties weights 
 
OLS with PCSE  1981 – 1998 
16 countries 
 
Nash type of tax competition 
present; negative effect of open-
ness 
35 
Swank (2007) STR Corporate 
income 
Nash model Openness and eco-
nomic ties weights 
OLS with PCSE  1982 – 2002 
16 countries 
Nash type of tax competition 
present; negative effect of open-
ness 
16 
Notes: 1 Instrumental variable (IV), maximum likelihood (ML), general method of moments estimation (GMM), seemingly unrelated regression (SURE). 2 n.i. = not included in the analysis as not deal-
ing with horizontal tax competition between countries. 
 
22 
 
Table 6 includes the quantitative results derived from the second generation direct studies 
surveyed. Note, that we include only studies which deal with horizontal tax competition be-
tween countries (also see notes to Table 5). 
The table is again structured across several dimensions. First, means, standard deviations, 
25thm, 50th and 75th percentiles, minima and maxima as well as the share of significant un-
derlying regression coefficients are reported. Second, studies including an openness variable 
in their empirical model are separated from those which do not. This separation is made as 
results from first generation direct studies imply that openness is a relevant driver of tax 
rates. Third, we distinguish between the type of model used (pure Nash, mixed Nash and 
Stackelberg and pure Stackelberg model). Fourth, a separation by tax rates is made as this 
directly shows for which type of capital governments compete (e.g. STR for profits, EATR for 
new firms). Fifth, a separation by weights is carried out as this conveys valuable information 
concerning the cause of falling tax rates. In particular, uniform weights are in line with the 
presence of common intellectual trends determining tax policies (cf. Table 4). 
Starting with the studies not including an openness measure, Table 6 implies that the mean 
semi-elasticities for pure Nash models are all positively signed except for studies explaining 
MI-AETR. Thus, except for MI-AETR the results indicate that tax rates are strategic comple-
ments on average. Tax competition for mobile firms (MA-AETR and EATR) and profits (STR) 
is signalled. Furthermore, the mean value is positive across all definitions of the weighting 
matrix considered.xvi  
The negative coefficient for MI-AETRs implies that these tax rates are strategic substitutes, a 
result which is at odds with basic horizontal tax competition theory. A negatively signed coef-
ficient on the spatial lag might be indicative for econometric problems - like the omission of 
unobserved country heterogeneity or another important variable like a country’ openness - 
facing the estimations (also see Davies and Voget 2008 on this issue). 
Furthermore the table suggests that using uniform weights leads to the largest mean semi-
elasticity. The value of 2.3 suggests that a decrease in the averaged tax rates of competitor 
countries leads to a 2.3 percent decrease in the own tax rate on capital income. However, it 
should be noted that uniform weights are used only in one study. Thus, the number of under-
lying regression coefficients (four) driving this result is low. 
The last column of Table 6 shows that the majority of results from the pure Nash models also 
are statistical significant. Taken at face value these results imply that horizontal tax competi-
tion of the Nash type is not unlikely. 
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Turning to studies applying mixed Nash and Stackelberg models, Table 6 reveals compara-
ble results. Both parameters, the mean semi-elasticity on the spatial lag as well as that on 
the leader’s lagged tax rate, are positively signed. However, the leaders lagged tax rates 
frequently is short of statistical significance. Given this result a Stackelberg leader type hori-
zontal tax competition is a rather unlikely event. In contrast, three fourth of the underlying 
Nash regression coefficients, all based on geographic and economic distance weights, are 
statistically significant from zero signalling the presence of horizontal tax competition of the 
Nash type. 
Thus, studies excluding an openness variable deliver evidence in favour of Nash type tax 
competition between countries. However, as implied by the direct studies of the first genera-
tion, the results derived in these papers may suffer from an omitted variable bias. This latter 
bias is avoided by studies which add openness proxies to their empirical model. 
Results from pure Nash models containing a country’s openness among the set of exoge-
nous variables reveal that EATRs, EMTRs and STRs may be strategic complements and 
MA-AETRs are strategic substitutes. However, the majority of underlying regression coeffi-
cients is insignificant in case of MA-AETR and EMTR. 
Mean semi-elasticities are again positively signed across the various definitions of the 
weighting matrix. An interesting aspect is that uniform weights now result in the lowest mean 
semi-elasticity. Moreover, the majority of underlying regression coefficients lacks statistical 
significance. This is in marked contrast to other weighting matrix types where at least 50 per-
cent of the underlying regression coefficients are statistically significant. These results lend 
further support for the presence of tax competition as driver of falling tax rates. Especially 
horizontal tax competition for profits and new firms seems to be at force. 
Mixed Nash and Stackelberg models are in favour of Nash as well as Stackelberg type tax 
competition for profits. The mean semi-elasticities based on STRs are positively signed and 
more than 50 percent of the underlying regression coefficients are statistically significant. In 
contrast, Nash type tax competition for new firms is not signalled by this model type. The 
underlying regression coefficients all fall short of statistical significance. Moreover, results for 
the EATR based on the leader’s lagged tax rate are not consistent with Stackelberg leader 
type of tax competition for new firms as the mean semi-elasticity is negatively signed. How-
ever, the number of underlying regression coefficients the calculation is based upon again is 
low. 
Finally, one study applied a pure Stackelberg leader model (i.e. it does not include WTax-j). It 
does not find any evidence in favour for this type of tax competition.  
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Taken together, second generation direct studies including an openness variable, which are 
preferred over studies excluding an openness measure indicate the presence of Nash and 
Stackelberg type of tax competition for profits. Our results suggest that a one percentage 
point change in the weighted average STR of competitor countries leads to a change in the 
own STR by about 0.9 to 1 percent (see means values for STR, international studies with 
openness variable, Nash coefficients). The reaction to a one percentage point change in a 
leader’s tax rate is about 0.21 percent (see mean value for STR, international studies with 
openness variable, Stackelberg coefficients).  
Results are also in favour of Nash type tax competition for new firms although the evidence 
is somewhat less clear cut due to the results derived from mixed Nash and Stackelberg 
models. Stackelberg leader type tax competition for new firms is not supported by the results. 
Moreover, no convincing evidence is provided for the presence of tax competition for invest-
ments of already existing firms.  
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Table 6: Summary information on semi-elasticities of the tax variable(s) derived from second generation models (without extreme outliers1) 
 Mean Std.dev. Min. 25 Perc. Median 75 Perc. Max. 
Share of 
significant2 
regression 
coefficients 
1. Studies without openness variable(s)         
a. Pure Nash models         
i. Tax definitions         
MA-AETR 0.2053 1.0270 -0.3358 -0.0855 -0.0205 0.0073 3.8972 13 / 15  
MI-AETR -0.0251 0.0193 -0.0546 -0.0476 -0.0146 -0.0089 -0.0082 7 / 7 
EATR 0.5159 1.1032 -0.0165 -0.0063 0.0064 0.0947 3.4410 14 / 18 
STR 0.3778 1.2357 -2.7476 -0.0036 0.0069 0.7225 4.7101 16 / 24 
ii. Weights         
Uniform 2.3038 1.1887 1.1897 1.2795 2.2923 3.3282 3.4410 4 / 4 
Geographic and economic distance 0.2015 0.9427 -2.7476 -0.0165 -0.0024 0.0088 4.7101 46 / 59 
Economic ties 0.1544 - 0.1544 - - - 0.1554 0 / 1 
         
b. Mixed Nash and Stackelberg models         
i. Tax definitions         
Nash coefficients:             
MA-AETR 4.3302 0.4034 3.8430 3.9986 4.4046 4.6617 4.6685 3 / 4 
Stackelberg coefficients:            
MA-AETR 0.2515 2.1985 -4.5332 -1.2855 1.2585 1.4208 3.7348 4 / 12 
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ii. Weights         
Nash coefficients:             
Geographic and economic distance 4.3302 0.4034 3.8430 3.9986 4.4046 4.6617 4.6685 3 / 4 
         
2. Studies with openness variable(s)         
a. Pure Nash models         
i. Tax definitions         
MA-AETR -1.1291 1.2934 -3.8500 -1.6972 -0.5438 -0.2559 -0.1893 1 / 8 
EATR 1.4037 1.7622 -2.3275 0.0951 1.1409 2.7498 4.8512 43 / 60 
STR 0.8998 1.1387 -1.4417 0.0145 0.6161 1.6696 4.0541 65 / 91 
EMTR 0.2470 0.3469 -0.0005 0.0183 0.1133 0.1596 0.8777 1 / 9 
ii. Weights         
Uniform 0.0769 1.3270 -3.8500 -0.3592 0.0882 0.7418 2.2769 11 / 28 
Geographic and economic distance 0.9900 1.2933 -1.3714 0.0045 0.5795 1.9018 4.0541 26 / 34 
Size 1.0999 1.3771 -1.1637 0.1321 0.6265 2.0071 4.3846 20 / 30 
Openness 1.2179 1.5608 -2.3275 0.1697 0.9478 2.3765 4.8512 52 / 74 
Economic ties 0.1830 0.2538 0.0036 0.0036 0.1830 0.3625 0.3625 1 / 2 
         
b. Mixed Nash and Stackelberg models         
i. Tax definitions         
Nash coefficients:             
EATR 0.0584 0.0136 0.0410 0.0503 0.0569 0.0697 0.0738 0 / 5 
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STR 0.9883 1.4493 -4.3652 0.1222 1.2776 1.8680 3.4602 19 / 36 
Stackelberg coefficients:            
EATR -0.4574 0.3033 -0.7277 -0.5997 -0.5241 -0.4964 0.0610 3 / 5 
STR 0.2090 1.0046 -1.7301 -0.6171 0.2422 0.6388 2.6883 22 / 30 
ii. Weights         
Nash coefficients:             
Geographic and economic distance 2.4399 0.7004 1.8100 1.8100 2.3157 3.1940 3.1940 3 / 3 
Size 1.1818 1.9263 -4.3652 0.1597 1.5172 2.3955 3.4602 10 / 15 
Economic ties 0.4706 0.7344 -0.8055 0.0738 0.1225 0.9595 1.9260 6 / 23 
         
c. Pure Stackelberg models         
i. Tax definitions         
EATR -0.1433 - -0.1433 - - - -0.1433 1 / 1 
         
Notes: Only studies which focus on horizontal tax competition between countries are used for computing this table. 1 Semi-elasticities which are 2-times the standard deviation of the overall study 
sample. 2 Significance level: the significance level is that of the underlying regression coefficient; 20% with two-sided test statistic and 10% with a one-sided test statistic. Perc. = percentile. 
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6. Discussion 
Taken together the first and second generation direct studies surveyed find support for tax 
competition for new firms and for profits as a driver of falling tax rates. This result also seems 
plausible when one takes into consideration the political statements of public officials which 
often suggest that tax competition forces are at work.xvii Moreover these findings are consis-
tent with results from indirect studies (see above and Devereux 2007). 
However, first generation direct studies do not model strategic interactions in tax setting. 
Thus, their results do not constitute clear cut evidence in favour of tax competition as a driver 
of falling tax rates. By employing tax reaction function models to account for strategic interac-
tions between countries, the second generation of direct studies concentrates on neighbours’ 
tax rates as determinants of own tax rates (Nash games) or on a leader’s lagged tax rate 
(Stackelberg games).  
As outlined in the introduction tax rates might also decline for other economic, institutional 
and political reasons than tax competition. Frequently, second generation direct studies try to 
discriminate between the various causes of falling tax rates by exploring whether strategic 
interaction in tax setting is only present in the case of sufficiently open economies (e.g. 
Devereux et al. 2008). However, yardstick competition and common intellectual trends may 
also influence tax policies in open economies.xviii Moreover it is plausible that in closed 
economies simply no external forces, such as yardstick type pressures or the emergence of 
novel theoretical insights, will have an impact on tax policies and these factors are also “open 
economies issues”. Thus, establishing strategic interdependence based on the openness of 
countries is consistent with tax competition forces, but it does not unambiguously isolate the 
underlying cause.  
So how could a procedure to isolate the role of tax competition as a driver of falling tax rates 
look like? One approach is outlined in Redoano (2007), who uses various definitions of the 
weighting matrix (W) to distinguish different causes of falling tax rates within a second gen-
eration direct studies framework of the Nash typ. Figure 1 basically replicates Redoano’s 
reasoning.  
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Figure 1: Discrimination among various causes of falling tax rates 
 
Source: Redoano (2007, p. 8) 
According to Redoano (2007), horizontal tax competition is correctly identified if (a) the coef-
ficient on the interaction term (which is the weighted average tax rate; i.e. WTax-j) is i) non-
zero, ii) positive and iii) not sensitive to election years; if (b) results are not only present in 
case of uniform weights and if (c) the study is concerned with a mobile tax base.  
The sensitivity to election years would refer to yardstick competition as the government tries 
to react or imitate the neighbour’s tax policy to stay in office. As mentioned above (cf. Table 
4) well performing uniform weights indicate that no matter how distant the neighbouring 
countries are, how similar their economies are or how intensive their economic integration is, 
the own tax rate depends on the neighbours’ tax rate to an equal strength. Such results 
would support the presence of common intellectual trends in tax setting which are incorpo-
rated in all countries independently. Once yardstick competition and common intellectual 
trends can be excluded horizontal tax competition is correctly identified if the tax base is mo-
bile, which is another precondition of horizontal tax competition. 
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Redoano (2003 and 2007) includes election year dummy variables in her empirical models. 
Yet, no significant relationship with the tax rate on corporate income is established. Thus, 
based on Figure 1 yardstick competition could be excluded as a cause of falling tax rates. 
Moreover, based on our survey the presence of a positive coefficient on WTax-j is likely, as 
the majority of mean semi-elasticities derived is positive (cf. Table 6). Furthermore, uniform 
weights do not outperform other types of weighting matrices (in case of the preferred models 
containing an openness variable). Hence, applying the approach of Redoano (2007) offers 
additional evidence in favour of tax competition as a driver of falling corporate income tax 
rates.  
However, in our opinion, a fully convincing approach should model the political aim behind 
tax rate cuts more directly than via different weighting matrixes and election year dummies. 
An approach in this respect could be based on the definition of tax competition given above 
which follows Wilson and Wildasin (2004). This definition may be used to derive precondi-
tions for the existence of horizontal tax competition. In turn, these preconditions – as well as 
variables indicating alternative causes of falling tax rates – can be captured within a two-
equation empirical model aiming to explore the causes of falling corporate income tax rates.  
For instance, Bellak and Leibrecht (2007) derive four preconditions for horizontal corporate 
income tax competition for mobile capital based on the Wilson and Wildasin (2004) definition. 
The four preconditions are (1) capital mobility is technically possible and MNEs make use of 
this possibility; (2) governments reduce relevant tax rates on corporate income; (3) one ex-
plicit motivation of tax rate cuts is to attract mobile capital or to react to downward revisions 
of other countries’ corporate income tax rates to avoid losing investment; and (4) corporate 
income taxes are a significant determinant of capital investment decisions. Note that precon-
dition (4) represents the indirect approach to analyzing tax competition briefly outlined above 
and precondition (3) captures the argument of second generation direct studies for analyzing 
the presence of tax competition.  
Thus, one way to model tax competition as a driver of falling tax rates could be to combine 
indirect and direct studies in a two-equation model. Precondition (1) can be incorporated into 
this model by including de jure and de facto openness measures in the set of regressor 
which is also the main point behind first generation direct studies. Precondition (2) can be 
operationalized by using the relevant tax rates, for instance the EATR in case of tax competi-
tion for new firms, as a dependent variable in the equation capturing second generation di-
rect studies and as independent variables in the equation capturing indirect studies. This 
makes the two-equation model a simultaneous model. Moreover, the impact of common in-
tellectual trends on corporate tax rates can be captured following Slemrod (2004) who uses 
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the tax rate on personal income as a determinant of the tax rate on corporate income. 
Changes in the political climate can be incorporating via the inclusion of institutional variables 
pinpointing a country’s attitude towards a more (less) egalitarian society. In addition, follow-
ing Redoano (2007), different weighting matrices and an election year dummy can be used in 
the equation, capturing the second generation direct studies. However, it is crucial to include 
a variable capturing the governments’ reason for changing tax rates in this equation (precon-
dition 3). Of course, this is not an easy task. Following Altshuler and Grubert (2004), it could 
be assumed that “If countries are engaging in tax competition we would expect those that are 
losing market share (those with the most to gain) to lower their effective tax rates more than 
the average.” (p. 5) Thus, the inclusion of a variable capturing a country’s share in world FDI 
as a regressor could pinpoint the political aim of tax rate changes.xix 
7. Summary 
This paper provides an overview of empirical studies dealing with tax competition for mobile 
capital. It places particular focus on studies modelling strategic interaction in tax policies of 
competing jurisdictions – which is at the heart of the competition concept. Furthermore, it 
addresses the question of whether existing studies convincingly isolate tax competition as a 
driver of falling corporate income tax rates. 
Given the empirical evidence surveyed, it appears that tax rates indeed fall due to tax com-
petition, in particular due to competition for profits and new firms. However, a closer look at 
the empirical approaches applied in the papers surveyed suggests that, in any case, the iso-
lation of the role tax competition plays in the drop in corporate tax rates is demanding. Even 
if existing empirical studies have made considerable progress in recent years in this respect, 
there is still room for further research, such as the identification and adequate modelling of 
important preconditions for tax competition within an empirical model.  
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Appendix: Derivation of semi-elasticities for this paper 
The semi-elasticity of variable y with respect to variable x is given by אSൌ  ሺ%∆୷ሻ∆୶  which shows 
the percentage change in variable y when variable x changes by one unit (see Wooldridge 
2009, p. 46). The derivation of semi-elasticities from published regression coefficients cru-
cially depends on the measurement of the dependent variable and the exogenous variable of 
main interest. The studies surveyed are based on four different operationalizations: (i) log-
level models; (ii) level-level models; (iii) log-log models and (iv) level-log models. Here, “log-” 
means that the dependent variable is used in logarithmic form and “level-“ implies that it is 
used untransformed. The same applies to “-log” and “-level” but in this case it captures the 
measurement of the independent variable of main interest. 
a. Log-level models:  
Semi-elasticities are easily derived from log-level models by multiplying the regression coef-
ficient ( ෠ܾ) by 100: ԖS ൌ 100 כ b෠. Note, however, that in the case of second generation direct 
studies the independent tax variable and in the case of first generation direct studies the de 
facto openness variable have to be measured in percent (i.e. for instance as 35 percent). If 
they are measured as proportions (e.g. 0.35) then the semi-elasticity of a one percentage 
point change simply is the regression coefficient ( ෠ܾ). Moreover, if the independent variable is 
a binary dummy variable then the semi-elasticity is derived as ԖS ൌ 100 כ ሺexpୠ෡ െ  1ሻ.  
b. Level-level models:  
In this case ԖS ൌ 100 כ ୠ
෡
୷ഥ. Thereby ݕത is the sample overall-mean of the dependent variable. 
The papers surveyed measure the tax and the de facto openness variables in percent or in 
proportions. Combinations of percent and proportions are also frequently used (i.e. y and x in 
percent; y and x in proportions; y in percent and x in proportion and vice versa). The formula 
given above is applied in all cases except for x being measured as proportion. In this case 
ԖS ൌ ୠ
෡
୷ഥ. In any case ݕത is measured in percent. 
c. Log-log models: 
The coefficients from log-log models are elasticities (߳̂) of variable y with respect to variable 
x. Thus, semi-elasticities can be derived by ԖS ൌ  ଵ଴଴כ஫ො୶ത . Thereby ݔҧ is the sample overall-
mean of the independent variable. In the case of second generation direct studies ݔҧ is the 
sample overall-mean of the weighted average tax rate of competitor countries measured in 
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percent. In the first generation direct studies, ݔҧ is the sample overall-mean of the various 
openness measures used, whereby de facto measures are also used in percent. 
d. Level-log models:  
In this case ԖS ൌ  100 כ ୠ
෡
୷ഥכ୶ത. Thereby ݕത and xത are the sample overall-means of the dependent 
and the independent variables both measured in percent (if x is a tax rate variable or de facto 
openness variable). If the endogenous variable is measured in proportions instead of percent 
than the regression coefficient is multiplied by 100 before the given formula is applied. In any 
case ݕത and ݔҧ are measured in percent. 
 
.
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Notes: 
                                                 
i The appendix sketches how regression coefficients are turned into semi-elasticities. 
ii Tax rates are effective if they capture stipulations concerning the tax base. 
iii It has to be noted that the profit shifting opportunities of firms depend on tax base related aspects 
like thin-capitalization rules or the availability and tax treatment of hybrid financing instruments which 
share characteristics of debt and equity (see e.g. Eberhartinger and Six 2009). We are very grateful to 
the referee who pointed out these issues. 
iv A backward looking marginal effective tax rate is proposed by Gordon et al. (2003). So far this tax 
rate has not been used in the empirical tax competition literature. 
v However, these rates can be used ex-post to explore the distribution of the corporate income tax 
burden across different firms and sectors (MI-AETR) or the distribution of the tax burden across differ-
ent types of tax bases (capital, labour, consumption (MA_AETR)). Moreover, these rates can also be 
used to explore ex-post the extent of tax-planning possibilities of firms as they are based on real data. 
vi As such studies do not explicitly deal with the presence of tax competition they have not been in-
cluded in our survey. 
vii Note that both published and unpublished papers are included in the table. 
viii Note, that for second generation studies this aspect is of minor importance as the independent vari-
able of main interest in any case is a tax rate. 
ix Extreme values which are greater than twice the standard deviation are excluded from the analysis. 
x Indeed the coefficients included in the positive mean value are all taken from studies which explore 
the presence of tax exporting effects in tax policy (Huizinga and Nicodème 2006). 
xi In Nash games this is unambiguously so if each government has only one strategic variable to com-
pete for mobile capital. When more strategic variables are given, then indirect effects have to be con-
sidered (see Devereux et al. 2008, p. 1217f for more details). 
xii Again, published and unpublished work is included in the survey. Note, that studies using as de-
pendent variable the tax base rather than a tax rate (e.g. Brett and Pinske 2000; and Riedl and Rocha-
Akis 2007 and 2008) are not included in the survey. 
xiii The latter type of investments is summarized as “capital” in Devereux et al. (2008). 
xiv In case of GDP-level weights a statistical significant coefficient greater one is found which implies 
an explosive behaviour of the spatial lag model. 
xv Redoano (2007) argues that her result “is possibly due to the fact that countries who want to join the 
EU want to show to other EU members that they have ‘aligned’ policies for being accepted and also 
because the EU as an Institution provides a safer environment where countries need to compete less 
with the outside and more among themselves.” (p. 23) 
xvi Note that these values above 1 do not per se imply an explosive pattern of spatial dependence. 
These values are conditional upon the transformation of the semi-elasticity computation. For example, 
given an estimated coefficient (elasticity) of 0.5 and given a mean of the independent variable of 33 
percent the semi-elasticity is computed as follows: (0.5*100)/33=1.51. See the Appendix for details. 
xvii See, for example, Bellak and Leibrecht (2007) for a survey of such political statements in the case 
of Central and Eastern European Countries which have markedly reduced their tax rates during the 
last decade. 
xviii Anselin (2002) points out an identification problem: the basic spatial lag models suffer from a lack 
of identifying the underlying economic mechanism (tax competition or yardstick competition) which 
causes the spatial interaction. 
xix Recent empirical evidence on the determinants of FDI indicates that agglomeration forces play a 
crucial role for attracting FDI and for the tax rate sensitivity of FDI. This also implies that the incentive 
to engage in tax competition of those countries which offer substantive agglomeration advantages 
might be rather low. Hence, the inclusion of agglomeration variables may substantially impact on the 
estimated strategic interaction in tax setting between countries. Indeed, some papers surveyed here 
include a proxy variable for agglomeration forces in their empirical model (e.g. Garretsen and Peeters 
2007; Krogstrup 2005). For instance, Garretsen and Peeters (2007) find that “compared to more peri-
pheral countries, core countries have a higher corporate tax rate” (p. 22). This indicates that agglome-
ration effects may matter for the strength of tax competition. Thus, agglomeration forces should also 
be captured within the above sketched two-equation model. 
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